Between 2013 and the end of 2025, an estimated 7.9 million Venezuelans left their country, accounting for around a quarter of the population. Most of this diaspora is located within the region, with Colombia and Peru being the main host countries. As neighbouring Latin American countries have tightened their migration policies, Venezuelans have increasingly turned to more distant destinations, notably the United States and Spain. In the US, the inauguration of the Trump II administration in early 2025 resulted in a sharp change in policy. The withdrawal of temporary protected status and increased deportations have led to a significant reduction in irregular arrivals. Concurrently, thousands of Venezuelan migrants en route to the US turned back south. Within the European Union (EU), the number of asylum applications from Venezuelans increased by almost a quarter in 2025. This made Venezuelans the second-largest group of applicants for international protection in the EU, with the vast majority of applications submitted in Spain.
Following an agreement in February 2025 between the Trump II administration and the Venezuelan authorities, deportations from the US to Venezuela have been taking place in a structured manner, with two flights a week. A total of 14,310 Venezuelans were deported via 76 flights in 2025. From mid-January 2026, the US authorities increased these repatriation flights to three per week. US federal agents do not solely target detainees with a criminal record; they also detain migrants in residential areas and on the streets. Almost half of those arrested in autumn 2025 had no criminal record. Nevertheless, US authorities often portray Venezuelan migrants as being linked to the Venezuelan criminal organisation, Tren de Aragua. In March 2025, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) transferred 252 Venezuelans to the Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), a high-security prison in El Salvador. According to human rights organisations, they are being held there in inhumane conditions pending their eventual repatriation to Venezuela.
The Venezuelan government is attempting to control the narrative surrounding migration by presenting itself as a protector of its citizens when they return home. Voluntary returns from within the region and deportation flights from the US are part of the government programme Gran Misión Vuelta a la Patria (GMVP). Upon arrival in Venezuela, the authorities welcome the returnees, publicly presenting them as victims of deception and exploitation abroad. At the same time, they undergo checks by the intelligence and security services. Several TikTok influencers were arrested by the authorities under the controversial Anti-Hate Law in 2025 after being forcibly returned by the US.
Delcy Rodríguez has led the Venezuelan government since the US military operation in January 2026 that resulted in the arrest of Nicolás Maduro. In February 2026, parliament passed a new amnesty law which, according to the authorities, aims to reduce political tensions in the country and facilitate the release of political prisoners. However, NGOs have strongly criticised the law. For example, a judge must approve the amnesty for each individual, and Venezuelans living abroad must appear in person before a court to benefit from it. Furthermore, the law excludes various categories, including military personnel and individuals alleged to have called for or supported an armed uprising. Consequently, opposition leader María Corina Machado is still unable to return to Venezuela without risk. Against this backdrop, the Venezuelan diaspora has adopted a wait-and-see approach. There is as yet no sign of a large-scale return. Many Venezuelans say they want to see concrete signs of economic stability and political security before considering returning to Venezuela.
At the same time, the monitoring and intimidation of dissidents abroad remained a key feature of the period from 2024 to 2026. To this end, the Venezuelan government has employed various repressive measures, including passport cancellations, public branding of opponents as traitors, and attempts to revoke their nationality through legal proceedings. These tactics have been particularly well documented in relation to Venezuelans in the US and Spain. In some cases, including in Chile and Colombia, members of the opposition have also been the target of abductions and armed attacks.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.