The aim of this research is to provide an overview of the security situation in Burkina Faso. It covers the period from 10 June 2023 to 9 July 2024. This document updates the COI Focus of 13 July 2023.
Since the first attacks by jihadist groups in Burkina Faso in 2016, clashes with the security forces and the number of civilian casualties have continued to rise. The situation continued to deteriorate during the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024.
Despite ground offensives by the army and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie, VDP), efforts to halt the advance of the jihadists have failed to achieve the intended containment, with setbacks occurring in several regions. The general mobilisation has been extended until 18 April 2025. Protests against the authority of Captain Ibrahim Traoré are mounting in the barracks.
Military cooperation between Burkina Faso and Russia was formalised in January 2024. With its neighbours Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to create the Confederation Alliance of Sahel States in July 2024.
International and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media and survivors of attacks regularly accuse the security forces and the VDP of committing acts of violence and murder against civilians - particularly from the Peuhl community - suspected of collaborating with armed groups or simply living near them.
Kidnappings and forced conscription of civilian and military opponents are on the increase. Several sources have denounced the use of torture by the authorities in the context of these practices.
New VDPs have appeared in some communes. They continue to play the role of ‘pyromaniac firefighters’, defending certain localities but above all fuelling ethnic tensions and the violence of jihadist groups.
The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, JNIM) is the most active armed player in the regional conflict in the Sahel and in Burkina Faso. It is believed to control or exert significant influence over vast areas of territory, carrying out actions, including mass violence, in eleven of the country's thirteen regions. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) mainly operates in the Liptako-Gourma region.
The jihadist groups are the perpetrators of numerous acts of violence, including direct strikes on emblematic symbols of state power, hostage-taking and attacks on schools and civilians. They impose embargoes and blockades on towns and villages, and up to entire administrative subdivisions. They are also waging an economic war in which the civilian population is the primary victim.
Amnesty International (AI) stresses that all parties to the conflict have perpetrated atrocities against the population. For the period from 10 June 2023 to 21 June 2024, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 1,524 incidents in Burkina Faso. Armed clashes and attacks on civilians were the most frequent forms of violence.
According to an expert on the security situation in the Sahel, civilians are targeted more for their geographical proximity and alleged links with jihadist groups than on the basis of their ethnicity.
According to ACLED, the East region was the most affected by insecurity (1,878 victims), followed by the Sahel (1,692 victims) and Centre-North (1,409 victims) regions. There have been no large-scale attacks in the capital for several years, but several observers have pointed to the risk of an attack occurring there.
In March 2024, the United Nations (UN) reported that 6.3 million people (out of a population of 20 million) needed humanitarian assistance. In addition, on 31 January 2024, 5,400 schools were closed, 789 health facilities were operating at minimal or zero capacity, and more than two million people were food insecure.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.