In 1966, two major military coups sparked a widespread campaign against the Igbo ethnic group, resulting in political unrest, ethnic violence, and economic tensions. The Igbos accused the federal government of marginalisation. On 30 May 1967, the Igbo region in the south-east seceded, triggering the 'Biafran War', which claimed more than a million lives, mainly from starvation, in three years.
Over 50 years on, the Biafra issue remains unresolved. Deep-rooted sense of identity and perceived marginalisation continue to fuel separatist movements, particularly via social media, which articulates, reproduces and publicises historical memories related to Biafra. The neo-Biafran movement continues to advocate the separation of the Igbo ethnic group from Nigeria.
Since 2021, various factors have contributed to a resurgence of violence, such as economic deficits, administrative disadvantages, political marginalisation, cultural and religious differences, nostalgia for the old Biafra, and the desire for a more progressive country. From 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 1,683 incidents in south-eastern Nigeria, resulting in 2,109 casualties.
Of the separatist groups, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which was founded in 2013, appears to have gained the upper hand over the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), which was founded in 1999. Following the re-arrest of its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in 2021, the IPOB split into two factions: the Directorate of State (DOS), led by Chika Edoziem; and Autopilot, led by Simon Ekpa. The Eastern Security Network (ESN) is the paramilitary wing of the DOS. Nnamdi Kanu retains significant support in south-eastern Nigeria, particularly among young people. However, his influence appears to be waning among the region's elite and older residents. Initially renamed the Biafra Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE), the Autopilot branch became the United States of Biafra (USB), and its armed wing is the Biafra Liberation Army (BLA). This dissident faction issues instructions for protest lockdowns, which are followed either out of conviction or fear of violence.
Other smaller groups are also calling for Biafra's independence. While some activists are sincerely committed to the cause of secession and work towards this goal without engaging in criminal activities, others — initially known as “unknown gunmen” and later as “Umuoma” — use the secessionist struggle as a pretext to carry out their illegal actions. As a result, secessionism, banditry, armed attacks and kidnappings are closely intertwined in the south-east. It is difficult to determine precisely which of these phenomena is responsible for each episode of violence.
In response to this situation, the Nigerian authorities have always opted for a repressive approach.
The security services particularly target IPOB members. Numerous human rights violations are regularly reported in this context. Meanwhile, Biafran independence groups repress dissenting voices and target the security services in their armed attacks.
New criminal groups are exploiting the absence of state authority in south-eastern Nigeria. They are combining armed rebellion, organised crime and using local power structures to establish themselves in the area in the long term.
According to the databases consulted, the states of Anambra and Imo are the most affected by violence. However, there are notable differences between the various Local Government Areas (LGAs) that make up these states.
Cedoca was unable to find precise figures on population displacement in the area studied, with the exception of the states bordering Cameroon.
The security crisis and lockdown orders restrict freedom of expression, information and movement, as well as access to public services such as hospitals and schools. The socio-economic fabric of south-eastern Nigeria has also been severely impacted, with substantial and prolonged economic costs.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.