Veiligheidssituatie

This COI Focus describes the security situation in Colombia for the period from January 2024 to February 2025.

The security situation during the year under review was mainly influenced by the Paz Total (Total Peace) peace negotiations. Formal negotiations began at the end of 2022 with eight different types of groups, including the rebel groups Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Segunda Marquetalia (SM) and Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the illegal armed groups Clan del Golfo, the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the local gangs Shottas and Espartanos in Buenaventura, various combos (local gangs) in the city of Medellín and finally Los Mexicanos, Los Locos Yam and the Cartel del Norte in Quibdó. Negotiations with the various groups have been erratic, and all have had different trajectories and faced different obstacles. The negotiations with the ELN initially made the most progress, resulting in a ceasefire between August 2023 and August 2024. However, this ceasefire was not extended again and armed confrontations between this group and the security forces resumed in the second half of 2024. The ceasefire with the EMC and the SM also collapsed. Throughout 2024, all of these groups also faced divisions within their ranks, as some within them wanted to negotiate with the government themselves. For example, the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF) group broke away from the EMC. A secession also occurred within the SM, which led to the founding of the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB). The Comuneros del Sur from the department of Nariño also split from the ELN for the same reason. Peace talks with the Clan del Golfo did not take place in 2024, although an initial attempt was made. Negotiations with the urban gangs also met with varying degrees of success.

The impact of these negotiations on the security situation was mixed. There had been a decrease in hostilities between state security forces and armed groups since the end of 2022. However, this decrease led to territorial expansion and violent competition between armed groups fighting for control of illegal activities. Each of the large armed groups expanded its territory and tightened its grip on the local population. According to an ACLED analysis, there was a decrease in lethal violence against civilians, while other forms of organised violence against the population increased. The groups also continued to diversify their criminal economies, with illegal mining, human trafficking and extortion becoming important sources of income alongside the drug trade. The many splits within the armed groups also increased the number of armed confrontations between them. At the end of 2024, the number of violent confrontations with the state also increased again as a result of the breakdown of negotiations with the main groups. The national homicide rate fell slightly, but 11 cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants saw an increase in homicides in 2024. Reports of extortion, kidnapping and threats also increased.

On 16 January 2025, the ELN carried out a massacre in the Catatumbo region, killing at least 80 people, including signatories of the 2016 peace agreement, human rights activists and civilians accused of supporting the EMBF. Two weeks after this violence, the Ministry of Defence reported more than 50,000 displaced persons, the highest number since records began in 1997. According to Colombia expert Elisabeth Dickinson, the ELN's modus operandi in Catatumbo shows that the organisation makes no distinction between combatants and civilians, nor between active combatants and former guerrillas. Following this violence, the president suspended the peace negotiations with the ELN and on 20 January 2025 he announced a “state of internal disturbance” for the entire region for 90 days. According to analysts, the events in Catatumbo have exacerbated the unstable relations between the various armed groups and raised fears of a spill-over effect. In mid-February 2025, the Colombian ombudsman's office (La Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, DPC) also warned of eleven new hotbeds of violence.

The deteriorating security situation at the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025 is forcing President Petro to take a new approach to his peace policy. Instead of negotiations with all armed groups, he now wants to start negotiations with local groups. He also intends to focus on intensifying military confrontations with the armed groups. The appointment of a general as defence minister in February 2025, something that has not happened since 1991, appears to confirm this intention.

The OCHA data show that the departments of Cauca, Antioquia, Arauca, Chocó, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Putumayo and Valle de Cauca have been most affected by violence during the reference period. Most of the violence takes place in rural areas, where the state's presence is limited and where multidimensional poverty rates tend to be higher. In these areas, the majority of the population is of indigenous or Afro-Colombian origin. On the other hand, some departments, such as Boyacá and Cundinamarca, have very low homicide rates, with a large number of municipalities where not a single homicide was recorded in 2024. Although the armed conflict is mainly concentrated in rural areas, the cities are hubs where illegal economic and political networks converge in the form of cocaine trafficking, money laundering and other activities of numerous armed groups that enrich themselves through transnational drug trafficking and crime.

During the reporting period, Colombia continued to face a high influx of Venezuelan migrants. Although the authorities have developed a clear framework for applying for residence permits, the influx of refugees poses additional challenges to society. The Clan del Golfo, in particular, focused on human trafficking and smuggling during the reporting period, with Venezuelans being the main victims.