Veiligheidssituatie

During the period from 2024 to 2025, the level of violence in Iraq remained relatively low compared to previous periods. ISIS confined its activities to small-scale ambushes and attacks, primarily in rural areas of northern and central Iraq. At the same time, tensions escalated between Iranian-backed militias (the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, or IRI) and American troops, resulting in targeted attacks on military installations. Turkish military operations against the Kurdish PKK in the north also impacted the civilian population.

Iraq is in a post-conflict context with a fragile security climate. The main threats are the ongoing conflict between Turkey and the PKK – which is also being fought on Iraqi soil –, the remnants of ISIS, Shiite militias with a political power base, and regional conflicts that affect Iraq. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria at the end of 2024 has created further uncertainty along the western border. While the Iraqi state formally controls most of the territory, in practice its monopoly on the use of force is challenged by autonomously operating militias, Kurdish forces, and foreign troops.

ISIS remains active in the form of clandestine cells, primarily in the Diyala–Kirkuk–Salah al-Din triangle. The organisation has been weakened, but not completely neutralised. Additionally, numerous militias exist within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), some of which are loyal to Iran. While these militias perform official security tasks, they also operate autonomously. Foreign troops, such as those belonging to the international anti-ISIS coalition, and Turkish units, also remain active. Kurdish security forces, particularly the Peshmerga and the Asayish, control the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR), but they are divided along party lines.

The violence is distributed unevenly across the country, with a higher concentration in two districts of the KAR, fewer incidents in southern Iraq, and more in Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din. Although on a limited scale, violence against civilians continues. Attacks are often directed at security forces, tribes, religious institutions or political figures.

The most targeted groups are federal government security forces and PKK militants, followed by civilians, PMF militias and foreign troops. In some cases, Kurdish security forces and infrastructure are also targeted. Target selection usually reflects local tensions, such as tribal rivalry or confrontations between security forces and armed groups.

Since 2024, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq has continued to decline, though approximately one million people remain displaced. Obstacles to returning home include security concerns, destroyed homes and a lack of basic services. To date, 291 villages and towns have recorded no returns. In some cases, local security forces are preventing people from returning. The majority of displaced persons are located in the Kurdish region and Ninewa. The number of newly displaced people has remained low, except in cases caused by drought or military operations.