On 26 July 2023, the presidential guard in Niger staged a coup. Since then, the junta has expelled French, German and American troops, while around 300 Italian troops remain. The new military leaders are turning to Russia and Turkey for military cooperation and assistance. Niger has withdrawn from existing multilateral security initiatives at the regional level, but is strengthening cooperation with military juntas in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali by establishing the Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES).
In 2025, Niger faced a series of security challenges. In the Tillabéri region, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) staged uprisings along the border with Mali and Nigeria, while the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusratul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) did the same along the border with Burkina Faso and Benin. JNIM and ISSP have increased their activity in the border regions. This is particularly evident in the Dosso region and in southern Tahoua. Meanwhile, the south-eastern Diffa region has been affected by the activities of two rival Boko Haram factions: Jamatu Ahli Sunna Lidda'Awati Waljihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
Throughout 2025, a number of trends characterised the security situation in Niger. These included an increase in the use of drones by non-state actors, economic warfare involving attacks on infrastructure and supply lines, kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners, and a shift in activities towards population centres.
During the period covered by this report (1 June 2025 to 28 February 2026), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 417 incidents in Niger, resulting in 1,597 fatalities. This is an increase in the number of incidents and fatalities recorded by ACLED during the same period the previous year (311 incidents with 1,271 deaths).
Battles, referring to clashes between two (or more) armed groups, account for 44% of the violence recorded by ACLED. ACLED attributes this increase to territorial battles in which jihadist groups are attempting to expand their power.
Of the total number of recorded violent incidents, almost half (46%) involved the targeting of civilians, resulting in 702 civilian deaths. ISSP is the main party responsible for this violence. The defence and security forces are failing to protect civilians while engaged in fighting with armed groups. Self-defence militias, which are usually organised along ethnic lines, provoke violent reactions from jihadists.
he regions most affected by violence are Tillabéri, Dosso (Dioundiou and Gaya), and Diffa (N'Guigmi, Diffa, and Bosso). While the jihadist insurgency in Niger is primarily rural, jihadists are increasingly targeting urban centres, as evidenced by the attacks on air force bases in Niamey and Tahoua in early 2026.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2025 Niger was home to 459,585 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Tillabéri region has the highest number of IDPs (221,717).
In rural areas, jihadists have strengthened their presence by exerting ideological pressure and engaging in economic extortion. Services such as education and healthcare are suffering as a result of the violence. Furthermore, violence is the main cause of food insecurity, as people lose their livelihoods due to displacement, and restrictions on freedom of movement limit access to food. The violence also hinders the delivery of humanitarian aid, although government-imposed restrictions also pose obstacles.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.